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Cleavage Structures and Dimensions of Ideology
in English Politics: Evidence From Voting Advice
Application Data
Jonathan Wheatley
The Left–Right dimension is the most common way of conceptualizing ideological difference. It is
based on the traditional cleavage in society between capital and labor. But in an ever more
globalized world, are the concepts of Left and Right as relevant today as they were half a century
ago? Following Kriesi et al. (2006) this article argues that the cleavage that exists in many
European societies between “winners” and “losers” of globalization has engendered a new
ideological dimension that pits “cosmopolitans” against “communitarians” and that draws on
cultural issues relating to identity, rather than economic issues. This argument is tested by
identifying latent dimensions from opinion data generated by two Voting Advice Applications
deployed in England in 2014 and 2015 and by mapping the positions of party supporters with
respect to these dimensions. It is found that in England the political space is defined by two main
ideological dimensions: an economic Left–Right dimension and a cultural communitarian–
cosmopolitan dimension. Finally, supporters of the newly formed United Kingdom Independence
Party are found to be located near the communitarian pole of the cultural dimension.
KEY WORDS: cleavages, ideological dimensions, political parties, voting advice applications, VAA,
mokken scale analysis
Introduction
Ideological difference is most commonly conceptualized in terms of political
dimensions. The Left–Right dimension is the best known of these, and is the one
most often used in common parlance. However, in recent years political scientists
have increasingly come to talk of a two-dimensional politics in Europe, defined
by one economic (Left–Right) dimension, and one cultural dimension that relates
to voters’ and parties’ positions on sociocultural issues. The most widely cited
conceptualization of this second dimension is that of Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and
Edwards (2006), who named it TAN/GAL, where TAN stands for traditionalism/
authority/nationalism and GAL refers to green/alternative/libertarian. This
article aims to investigate the empirical validity of economic Left–Right and
TAN/GAL by drawing from opinion data generated by two Voting Advice
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Applications (VAAs) deployed in England in 2014 and 2015. A further goal is to
explore the extent to which these dimensions are (or are not) valid across
different sections of the voting population.
“Left” and “Right” are ambiguous concepts; for Huber and Inglehart, the
Left–Right dimension is “an amorphous vessel whose meaning varies in
systematic ways with the underlying political and economic conditions in a given
society” (Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p. 90). Bobbio, a staunch defender of the
Left–Right dichotomy, uses the equality/inequality distinction to cover cultural as
well as economic matters but is left with a highly fluid concept as he himself
admits (Bobbio, 1996, p. 35). Moreover, the concepts of Left and Right have
proved extraordinarily flexible over time. First coined in post-revolutionary
France to distinguish supporters of the King and Church (the Right) from
supporters of the French Revolution (the Left), by the twentieth century these
concepts had acquired an economic significance with those on the Right
supporting free-market capitalism and those on the Left supporting redistribution
of wealth and defending the interests of labor. Today “Left” and “Right” are
variously used to refer to both economic ideologies (capital vs. labor) and cultural
ideologies (social liberalism vs. social conservatism).
That Left and Right in Western Europe took on an economic significance in
the twentieth century is unsurprising. By then the class cleavage, that is, that
between owner and worker, had become the dominant cleavage in society.
However, in their seminal essay of 1967 Lipset and Rokkan identify no less than
four potential societal cleavages that have structured the formation of party
politics in Western Europe since the end of the eighteenth century: the other three
being center versus periphery, state versus church (or religious vs. secular), and
land versus industry (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). In a comparison of Belgium,
Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland, Lijphart (1979) argues that in some
societies religious cleavages still take precedence over class divisions as a source
of conflict. Kriesi et al. (2006) identify a fifth societal cleavage that appeared at the
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first: that between
the “winners” and “losers” of globalization.
Given the complexities of societal cleavages in many European societies, is it
not possible that politics is rather too complex to be reduced to just one (Left vs.
Right) ideological dimension? Lipset (1959) warns that politics becomes especially
conflict-prone when the economic (capital vs. labor) cleavage reinforces a
religious–secular cleavage, leaving open the (more desirable) possibility that these
two cleavages may be cross-cutting, suggesting by implication the possibility of
at least two independent ideological dimensions. While not all (five) cleavages
identified above are relevant in all societies, it is very likely that more than one
may be relevant in most. If they are cross-cutting, rather than reinforcing, they
may define a multi-dimensional ideological space.
By the 1970s and 1980s, scholars were already proposing a second ideological
dimension that exists in parallel to the (economic) Left versus Right dimension.
Inglehart (1977, 1990) identified the emergence of a “new politics” based on what
he terms “post-materialist values” that emerged as part of the counter-culture of
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the 1960s and 1970s and that began to supplant—or exist in parallel with—
materialist values that were based on the imperative of economic need. “Post-
materialist values” include cultural notions of gender equality, gay rights,
environmental protection, and tolerance of alternative lifestyles. Based on these
concepts, some scholars suggest that two ideological dimensions—one economic
and one cultural—would better describe the ideological space in Europe than a
single all-encompassing Left–Right dimension. Thus Kitschelt suggests a libertar-
ian–authoritarian dimension in addition to an (economic) Left–Right dimension
(Kitschelt 1994, 1995), while Bobbio (1996) proposes a freedom–authoritarian
dichotomy to distinguish moderates from extremists on both the Left and the
Right. Marks et al. (2006), drawing strongly from Inglehart’s conceptualization,
came up with the above-mentioned acronym TAN/GAL. The well-known Chapel
Hill survey, carried out by scholars of the University of North Carolina, uses an
economic Left–Right dimension and a TAN/GAL dimension to locate European
political parties in a two-dimensional ideological space (Marks et al., 2006).
The political system in the United Kingdom is usually described as a two-
party system that is defined by a single Left–Right dimension, with the Labour
Party on the Left and the Conservative Party on the Right. The smaller third
party, the Liberal Democrats (previously the Liberal Party), is usually placed in
the middle of the spectrum or very slightly to the left of center. Although
religious and territorial issues played a major role in politics prior to the First
World War, subsequently their political salience faded (Moran, 1999). With the
rise of the Labour Party in the first part of the twentieth century socioeconomic
class became the most politically salient division in society and Left and Right
were seen primarily in economic terms. The Labour Party represented the
working class or labor, and the Conservatives, representing capital, were seen as
defenders of the middle classes. In the 1960s most Britons identified themselves
by class and class voting was prevalent, with a strong majority of the working
classes voting Labour and most middle class voters supporting the Conservatives
(Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2004, p. 40).
From the 1970s, however, patterns of class voting began to break down
(Clarke et al., 2004, 41–43; Heath et al., 1991, p. 64). Moreover, as the relative size
of the working class declined both main parties sought to build a “winning
coalition” from the burgeoning middle classes (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, p. 128).
As a result, the Labour Party shifted away from strongly redistributive policies
and, following Tony Blair’s election as leader in 1994, increasingly adopted
business-friendly policies and embraced the free market economy. This reduced
the distance between the two main parties on the economic dimension.
The structure of British politics shifted further in the beginning of the twenty-
first century, as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a eurosceptic
party formed in 1991 as the anti-Federalist League, began to draw votes from the
other parties. Weak on economic policy, UKIP was defined more by its stance on
cultural or identity issues such as Britain’s relation to Europe, immigration (for
which it advocated strict controls) and localism. UKIP took first place in elections
to the European Parliament (EP) in 2014 and came third in terms of votes, with
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12.6 percent, in the general elections of 2015. The two-party system in the United
Kingdom was further undermined by the Scottish National Party, which by 2015
had become the dominant party in Scotland, garnering 50 percent of the vote
there.
These developments suggest that British politics is becoming more complex
and can no longer be so easily defined by a single Left–Right dimension. While
UKIP is usually defined as “right-wing,” it is not defined in this way because of
its economic policy, but because of its stance on immigration and other identity
issues. For Ford and Goodwin (2014), UKIP draws from “left behind” voters,
typically older, blue-collar workers who feel that their interests are no longer
represented by the traditional parties, especially the Labour Party, which they
feel has neglected its traditional working class base and has become too
cosmopolitan and London-based. Essentially, they are describing voters who are
“left behind” by globalization and the changes associated with it, and are bitter
and resentful about their powerlessness. Indeed Kriesi et al. (2006) suggest that
globalization’s “losers” more often adopt a position of “cultural demarcation,”
rather than demand economic redistribution, leading many of them to turn to
populist, anti-immigration, anti-European Union (EU), “right-wing” parties. In an
earlier work I describe the cleavage between “winners” and “losers” of globaliza-
tion as one between “communitarians” and “cosmopolitans” (Wheatley, 2015).
David Goodhart instead uses the terms “communitarians” and “metropolitans.”
While the former group (to which UKIP supporters tend to belong) reject change,
prefer continuity and stability, and feel that “those close to us matter more than
people who are far away,”1 the latter welcome change, cultural diversity, and
geographical mobility. While the focus of this article is on England, the analysis
of Kriesi et al. (2006) would suggest that it may be meaningful to talk about a
communitarian–cosmopolitan dimension in much of Europe, especially in the
regions most exposed to globalization.
The question I seek to address in this article is how to define the ideological
space in England. Is it one-dimensional or multi-dimensional? Can we talk about
an economic Left–Right dimension and a GAL/TAN dimension, as Marks et al.
(2006) propose? Or should we instead talk of a new communitarian–cosmopolitan
dimension? And where does our new insurgent party, UKIP, fit into whatever
schema we deem most relevant?
In order to address these questions we draw from public opinion data
generated from an online application called a VAA, the purpose of which is to
help users decide how to vote in elections. Specifically, the data is drawn from
two VAAs: the EUvox VAA, which was deployed prior to elections to the EP in
May 2014, and WhoGetsMyVoteUK, which was deployed before the general
elections a year later. The data contains users’ opinions on 30 policy issues, and
in this article we use Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) to identify ideological
dimensions and locate users and, more specifically, party supporters on a policy
space defined by these dimensions. The approach is inductive; instead of
predefining ideological dimensions a priori like Marks et al. (2006), I “let the data
speak for itself” and predetermine neither the number nor the nature of each
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dimension. Another innovation of the approach in this article is that I focus
more on how voters are aligned, rather than on how political elites are aligned.
While traditional approaches to locating parties in an ideological space involve
elite surveys (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Toka, 1999) or manifesto
analyses (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001), here the
focus is—to adopt a term coined by Key (1964)—the “party-in-the-electorate.”
Of course, one problem we face is that VAA users are a self-selected sample
that may not be representative of the population at large. To help overcome this
problem, the analysis is performed on a randomly selected sample of users that
is more or less representative of the voting population in terms of vote intention.
This sample is then divided into a number of subsamples, based on age,
education, and political interest, and the analysis performed on each subgroup
separately. The goal of this sampling exercise is to see whether the coherence of
the dimensions identified varies between the different subsamples.
The overall findings are the following. First, two principal ideological
dimensions are identified from the opinion data generated by the two VAAs, one
of which is that between an economic Left and an economic Right and one of
which represents the divide described above between communitarians and
cosmopolitans. This second dimension is clearly distinctive from the TAN/GAL
dimension proposed by Marks et al. (2006). The two dimensions co-vary with one
another, with economically right-wing voters tending to be more communitarian
and economically left-wing voters tending toward the cosmopolitan end of the
spectrum.
The second main finding regards the role of UKIP. Users who identified
themselves as UKIP supporters in both VAAs are positioned near the communi-
tarian pole of the communitarian–cosmopolitan dimension. This conforms to the
hypothesis that UKIP supporters feel threatened by globalization, and that they
seek refuge in their close community and in “like-minded” people.
The third finding is probably the most dramatic. This is that among sub-
samples of voters with relatively low political interest and younger voters, the
covariances of user responses to policy issues belonging to the cultural
communitarian–cosmopolitan dimension are significantly higher than correspond-
ing covariances along the economic Left–Right dimension. Indeed among the
cohort that shows least interest in politics, the economic Left–Right dimension is
hardly a coherent dimension at all, while the communitarian–cosmopolitan
dimension remains relatively strong.
The fourth and final finding is methodological. This research shows that data
generated from VAAs, providing their limitations are understood and made
explicit, represent a useful tool for investigating the dimensionality of the policy
space. The advantage of the VAA as a tool is that it can present respondents with a
relatively large number of issue statements and an identical menu of response
options with which to answer them. This is likely to be arduous to implement in a
traditional face-to-face or telephone survey. The main disadvantage, of course, is
that users form a self-selected, rather than a representative sample, but as is shown
below there are mechanisms to overcome or at least assuage these difficulties.
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Given that the aim of a VAA is to help voters decide which party/candidate
most closely matches their policy preferences, it is unsurprising that most VAA-
related literature relates to issues involving VAA design, such as the spatial
models and metrics used in VAAs (Louwerse & Rosema, 2014), the effects of
statement selection on the advice provided (Walgrave, Nuytemans, & Pepermans,
2009), or methods for coding parties and candidates (Trechsel & Mair, 2011). This
research shows, however, that VAAs can also be used to research some of the
core puzzles in political science, such as dimensionality.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First I explain the method used for
analyzing the data generated by the VAAs, including identifying ideological
dimensions, mapping party supporters with respect to these dimensions, and
analyzing subsamples of the data. The results of the analysis are then presented,
followed by a short conclusion.
Method
As described in the previous section, the data used for this analysis was
generated by two VAAs deployed in the United Kingdom before the EP elections
in 2014 and before the 2015 general elections. Because somewhat different
questions were asked in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, only the
England data set is considered here, which was far larger than the other three.
The data set generated from EUvox (for the EP elections) in England contains
data from 60,728 users after cleaning, while the WhoGetsMyVote data set (from
the general elections) incorporates data from 17,353 users. The demographic
characteristics of each group of users is shown in Table 1. Both data sets appear
to demonstrate a degree of bias toward younger, more well-educated voters; this
bias appears to be especially significant in the case of WhoGetsMyVoteUK.
VAAs are online applications that enable users to compare their policy
preferences with those of political parties (or election candidates) in order to help
them decide how to vote. Users are presented with a number of policy or issue
statements to which they can express varying degrees of agreement or disagree-
ment. Independently, parties (or candidates) are either coded by experts or self-
coded on each statement. The application then matches the user and parties (or
candidates) in the form of a graphical display, which shows the user how close
they are to each party or candidate. Both EUvox and WhoGetsMyVoteUK
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of VAA Users
EUvox WhoGetsMyVoteUK
% female 36.5 49.3
Median age 38 29
% with university education! 63.2 70.9
Note: !Given the slightly different supplementary questions provided in the two VAAs,
this refers to the percentage with university or postgraduate education in EUvox and the
percentage who finished full-time education at least aged 20 in WhoGetsMyVoteUK.
6 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999
included 30 issue statements and users could respond with any one of the
following response categories: “completely agree,” “agree,” “neither agree nor
disagree,” “disagree,” “completely disagree,” and “no opinion.” In both VAAs,
users were also invited to answer a number of supplementary questions, which
included age, education, gender, and (in the case of EUvox) interest in politics
(very, somewhat, little, or not at all) or (in the case of WhoGetsMyVoteUK)
attention paid to politics (on a scale from 0 to 10). Further supplementary
questions also asked users to name the parties (if any) they (a) felt closest to,
(b) intended to vote for in the coming general elections, and (c) (for EUvox only)
intended to vote for in the EP elections. For all supplementary questions, the
option “I prefer not to say” was available, while for those involving the naming
of parties, the options “none,” “undecided,” and “I do not intend to vote” were
available. The data sets included the responses of users to all issue statements
and supplementary questions after extensive cleaning (for details of the data
cleaning process, see the Online Appendix).
Latent ideological dimensions were identified from users’ responses to the
30 issue statements. Of course, it could be argued that the items used in the
two VAAs are a product of the questionnaire designers’ preconceived ideas of
what are the fundamental ideological dimensions and that the dimensions
“discovered” simply reflect this latent bias. The EUvox VAA included 21 items
that were common to all EU member states (Items 1–7, 11–17, and 21–27; see
Table A1 in the Appendix), as well as nine that were specific to England. The
21 common items were divided into three main categories with seven items in
each category: “EU” (on EU issues), “economy” (on economic Left–Right issues),
and “society” (on TAN/GAL issues), based on the items used in the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). Given that the Chapel Hill Survey is
predicated on the two-dimensional model of Marks et al. (2006), supplemented
with a third European dimension (Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012), it is clearly true
that the items were selected according to predefined notions of dimensionality.
WhoGetsMyVoteUK items, on the other hand, were selected very differently; they
were designed to reflect England-specific issues that were politically relevant in
the run-up to the 2015 elections (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
As we shall see in the next section, the dimensionality revealed from the
EUvox data set failed to reflect the latent bias inherent in the questionnaire
design. Moreover, the dimensions identified from the WhoGetsMyVote data set,
which was designed according to very different principles, are virtually identical
to those identified from EUvox, which is perhaps testimony to the fact that the
bias made little difference to the overall findings.
Turning now to the method used for identifying dimensions from item
response variables, the most commonly used method for such an endeavor is
factor analysis, used previously by this author on user responses to issue
statements in VAAs, including in an earlier work on the England EUvox data set
(Wheatley, 2015). However, van der Eijk and Rose (2015) find that when factor
analysis is applied to ordered-categorical survey items (also often known as
Likert items), the analysis is prone to overestimating the number of latent
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dimensions (over-dimensionalization). Emons, Sijtsma, and Pedersen (2012) hold
that MSA is more suitable for analyzing discrete questionnaire data than either
principal component analysis (PCA) or confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and
that even when polychoric correlations are used in PCA and CFA (as in Wheatley,
2015), the assumption within this technique of latent normal distributions may
distort the results. For this reason this article uses MSA to identify latent
dimensions or scales from users’ responses to issue statements.
MSA has already been used on ordered-categorical VAA issue statements
either to map parties or to test the validity of the scales that are used to generate
two-dimensional maps in VAAs (Germann & Mendez, 2016; Germann, Mendez,
Wheatley, & Serd€ult, 2015). In this analysis, I apply MSA based on the Monotone
Homogeneity Model on user responses to the 30 issue statements. Following
Emons et al. (2012) and Hemker, Sijtsma, and Molenaar (1995) the automated
item selection procedure is run consecutively, increasing stepwise by 0.05 the
minimum threshold, c, for the item scalability coefficients Hj. The analysis
generates unidimensional scales and the strength (or coherence) of each scale is
defined by Loevinger’s H coefficient, which measures the consistency of
responses to items that belong to that scale. Following Mokken (1971) we consider
a scale to be strong if H" 0.5, medium if H" 0.4 and weak if H" 0.3. For more
details about how MSA is applied, see the Online Appendix.
The disadvantage of MSA in comparison with CFA is that while the root
mean square error of approximation in CFA helps the researcher to identify and
remove very similar items, MSA does not do so unless the frequency of each
response to each item (i.e., level of difficulty) is very similar (in which case
monotonicity violations may be flagged). First of all, therefore, we have to check
that no two items are substantively similar, that is, effectively refer to the same
issue. If they do, the risk is that we give too much weight to that issue within the
scale we identify, leading to a biased scale. Substantively “superfluous” items
should therefore be removed.
Second, given that we are identifying ideological dimensions, the results of
our analysis will be particularly sensitive to ideological biases in our data sets.
Before carrying out the analysis a sample of each data set is therefore distilled out
that corresponds to the voting population in terms of political affiliation.2 To do
this, quotas of users who expressed an intention to vote for each party are
randomly sampled. The numerical strength of each quota is proportional to the
number of votes won by that party in the relevant election. These party quotas
are then combined, together with a quota of convinced abstainers and undecided
voters as a proxy for those who did not vote. MSA is carried out on the (reduced)
data sets, rather than on the full sets of users. The total N is thereby reduced to
17,860 for EUvox and 4,568 for WhoGetsMyVoteUK.
Having identified scales (i.e., dimensions) that satisfy all of the above
conditions on these data sets, I calculate the position of all users that give an
opinion on the relevant items with respect to the dimensions identified. This is
done by summing the scores on all items that are deemed to belong to the
relevant scale (using reversed items if an item is pointing in the opposite
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“ideological direction” from others) and normalizing the sum to produce a value
of between zero and one. Party supporters are then identified as those users who
name as the same party (i) the party they felt closest to, (ii) the party they
intended to vote for in the forthcoming general elections, and (iii) (in the case of
EUvox) the party they intended to vote for in the EP elections. Considering only
the five largest parties in England—the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the
Liberal Democrats, UKIP, and the Green Party—I then calculate the mean
positions of each group of party supporters with respect to each dimension and—
if possible—plot graphically the contour lines that enclose 50 percent of party
supporters.
The analysis is then repeated on various different subsamples of users. Using
the reduced (politically representative) data sets, I first sample according to age,
taking one subsample consisting of those aged less than 40 in May 2015 (for
EUvox data this means sampling those born in 1975 or later) and one consisting
of those aged 40 or more. Next, I sample according to education. From the EUvox
data set I select those who have a university education and those who do not,
while from the WhoGetsMyVoteUK data set (in which the supplementary
questions are a little different), I select those who finished their education at age
20 and over and those who finished their education earlier. Finally, I select three
subsamples from both data sets on the basis of political interest/attention paid to
politics. From the EUvox data set I identify those who (i) are “very” interested in
politics, (ii) are “somewhat” interested in politics, and (iii) have “little” or “no”
interest in politics, while from the WhoGetsMyVoteUK data set I distinguish
between those who graded themselves between 8 and 10 on a 1–10 scale in terms
of attention paid to politics, from those graded 5–7, and finally those graded 0–4.
The final step is to use the coherence (or rather incoherence) of each scale as
the dependent variable and to perform a regression analysis using various
demographic and political affiliation variables as independent variables. This
helps us to find out whether the dimensions identified are more or less influential
in aggregating issue preferences among certain categories of users while
controlling for other possibly critical categories. I operationalize the dependent
variable as the number of Guttman errors in the relevant scale for each
respondent.3 The regression used is a negative binomial regression, which is most
appropriate for modeling count variables.
Results
As there was an emphasis on EU-related issues in EUvox, I first identify and
delete from the questionnaire any superfluous items. Three items are substan-
tively very similar and are about the same issue, so to include them all would
have given too much weight to that issue. These are Item 6 (on whether EU
membership is a bad thing), Item 9 (on remaining within the EU), and Item 10
(on holding an in–out referendum on EU membership). As Item 6 is more about a
judgment of the current situation than a policy and Item 10 may tap into two
separate constructs (whether the EU is a good thing and whether referendums
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are a good thing), I drop Items 6 and 10 and retain Item 9. WhoGetsMyVoteUK
covered a diverse range of issues and none could be seen as superfluous.
Analysis of both data sets reveals a two-dimensional structure. To see the
issue statements that load onto each dimension see Tables 2 and 3, and refer to
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for the wording of each issue statement. If the
item contains the suffix “_rev” this indicates that agreement with the item means
the user is contrary to the assigned “direction” of the dimension. In both tables
the value of Hj is given for each item. For the EUvox data set, the dominant
dimension is a cultural one that contains 10 items on EU integration, immigration,
gay marriage, and Islam. An economic dimension was also identified that
includes five items on the free market in health care, state regulation of the
economy, workers’ rights, cutting government spending, and tax cuts for the rich.
The dimensions identified from the WhoGetsMyVoteUK data are very similar
to the cultural and economic dimensions identified in the EUvox solution. The
cultural dimension includes 13 items on inheritance tax, wind farms, forcing
young people to work for benefits, gay marriage, the role of Christianity, localism,
EU membership, foreign aid, immigration, English votes for English laws, and
the European Convention for Human Rights, while the economic dimension
includes nine items on spending cuts, taxing the wealthy, nationalizing the
railways, benefit cuts, private sector involvement in health care, free schools,
university tuition fees, extraction of shale gas, and the Trident nuclear missile
system.
Overall, the outputs we obtain by analyzing the two data sets are very
similar. In both cases the economic dimension clearly refers to the economic Left–
Right dimension with which we are familiar. However, in both cases the
dominant dimension is the cultural dimension, which is of “medium” (H" 0.4)
strength in Mokken’s terminology, compared with a “weak” (H" 0.3) economic
Table 2. Mokken Scales Identified From EUvox Data Set
Item Dim 1 Dim 2
1 0.46
2 0.38
3 0.57
5_rev 0.43
9_rev 0.54
11 0.38
13 0.37
15 0.40
16 0.35
19 0.38
21 0.52
25_rev 0.41
28 0.51
29_rev 0.52
30 0.56
H 0.49 0.38
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dimension. Interestingly, only two (Items 21 and 25) of the seven items (Items 21–
27) in EUvox that were selected to represent the TAN/GAL dimension actually
load onto the cultural dimension. Issues on law and order, abortion and drug use
that for Marks et al. (2006) form the backbone of the TAN/GAL dimension
did not. Environmental or “green” issues, despite contributing to the “G” in
TAN/GAL, were found to be ambiguous; in EUvox, the controversial issue of
shale gas extraction (fracking) did not load onto any dimension, while in
WhoGetsMyVoteUK it was identified with the economic dimension. The issue of
wind farms, on the other hand, forms a part of the cultural dimension in the
WhoGetsMyVoteUK data set. The ambiguity of green issues contra Marks et al.
(2006) is also highlighted in the literature; Dalton (2009) finds that the relationship
between environmental issues and economic Left–Right issues in terms of party
positions has become significantly stronger in recent years.
The cultural dimension identified here from both data sets is therefore not the
same as TAN/GAL. Instead it consists of items that are strikingly similar to the
above mentioned conceptualization of the communitarian–cosmopolitan dimen-
sion, or what Kriesi et al. (2006) identify as the salient political differences
between “winners” and “losers” of globalization, given the prevalence of items
that focus on differences between the “in-group” (the community), and the “out-
group” (“others” such as immigrants, outsiders, gays, and the EU). While two
items in WhoGetsMyVoteUK—on inheritance tax (Item 3) and making young
people work for their benefits (Item 9)—that at first glance should belong to the
economic dimension do in fact load onto the cultural dimension, these items also
Table 3. Mokken Scales Identified From WhoGetsMyVoteUK Data Set
Item Dim 1 Dim 2
1 0.35
2_rev 0.33
3 0.36
6_rev 0.39
7_rev 0.34
8_rev 0.41
9 0.36
12 0.34
13 0.31
14_rev 0.32
15 0.38
17 0.39
19_rev 0.32
20_rev 0.34
21_rev 0.47
22_rev 0.48
23_rev 0.31
24 0.51
25 0.49
26 0.50
27 0.37
30 0.48
H 0.42 0.35
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reflect a degree of nostalgia for the “old world” of tradition, discipline, and
family ties that globalization appears to threaten.
For both data sets, the two dimensions identified correlate with one another.
Aggregating the items in each scale in order to calculate the position of all users
with respect to both dimensions in the manner described in the previous section,
we find that the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two dimensions is
0.487 for the EUvox data set and 0.387 for the WhoGetsMyVoteUK data set. In
both cases an economically left-wing position is associated with a cosmopolitan
position and an economically right-wing position is associated with a communi-
tarian position.
Let us now move on to the second stage of the analysis and plot the positions
of party supporters with respect to the two dimensions. The maps, which are
shown in Figure 1, plot the mean positions of party supporters (in a filled circle)
and the contour lines that enclose 50 percent of party supporters. The two
maps appear to show party supporters in very similar positions, although here
there are one or two subtle differences. First, in the WhoGetsMyVoteUK map
the position of Green Party supporters is rather more left wing economically
relative to the Labour Party in comparison with the EUvox positions. In Wheatley
(2015) the EUvox position of this party was already flagged as an anomaly, given
the Green Party’s strong anti-austerity rhetoric, but it was suggested that many
Green party supporters were protest voters, rather than hardcore leftists, and that
this explained the positioning of party supporters as rather more centrist than the
party itself. In this context, the position of party supporters as mapped from
WhoGetsMyVoteUK seems more coherent with the party’s overall position and
suggests that the increased publicity given to the Green Party after the EP
elections may have provided greater clarity to voters about where this party
stands.
The second—and rather more notable—discrepancy between the two maps in
Figure 1 relates to the position of UKIP supporters. In WhoGetsMyVoteUK UKIP
supporters appear further to the left economically than they do in EUvox. A
possible explanation for this is that as UKIP support declined after the EP
elections (around the time of the EP elections UKIP’s opinion poll ratings in the
UK as a whole averaged close to 20 percent, while UKIP’s vote in the general
elections was 12.6 percent), the more economically right-wing of UKIP supporters
switched to the Conservatives. This would appear to be consistent with the fact
that in the 2015 general elections the Conservatives were not badly damaged by
the UKIP threat, as many pundits had predicted, while UKIP often performed
rather well in Labour heartlands.4
I now analyze the subsamples of both data sets that have been selected
according to age, education, and political interest. Here we compare measures of
the overall scalability coefficient (Loevinger’s H) for the different subsamples. The
results are shown in Table 4. We see that for both data sets the strength (or
coherence) of both scales declines when we move from older voters (40 years old
or more in 2015) to younger voters (less than 40 years of age), although this
trend is more marked for the economic dimension. When we move from
12 Policy & Internet, 9999:9999
Figure 1. Party Maps: (a) EUvox, and (b) WhoGetsMyVoteUK.
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university-educated voters to less well-educated voters, we find that the strength
of the economic scale decreases significantly, but the coherence of the cultural
dimension remains more or less unchanged. But probably the most dramatic
effects are observed when we move from voters with a high interest (or attention)
in politics toward less interested (or attentive) voters. Here we observe that while
both scales become weaker with decreasing interest, this decrease is far more
dramatic for the economic scale in both data sets. Indeed, for the less interested
(or attentive) group, the economic scale does not form a coherent scale at all in
either data set, with H< 0.2, despite the fact that the cosmopolitan–communitarian
scale remains a coherent scale in both. All in all, the analysis would suggest that
the economic Left–Right scale is barely coherent as a scale among younger, less
well educated and, most importantly, less politically interested voters.
Using gender, education, and interest in politics as binary predictor variables5
and age and attention to politics (the 0–10 scale in WhoGetsMyVoteUK) as
continuous predictor variables, we now perform a negative binomial regression
on both data sets with the number of Guttman errors in each scale as the
dependent variable. As a second stage we augment the number of independent
variables by adding identification with each of the five main parties as binary
predictor variables. Table 5 lists descriptive statistics for the covariates in the
negative binomial regression for EUvox, while Table 6 does the same for
WhoGetsMyVoteUK. From Tables 5 and 6 we find that age and interest
in/attention paid to politics is a highly significant (p< 0.01) predictor of the
number of Guttman errors in the economic Left–Right scale in both data sets.
Thus, controlling for other variables, younger and less politically interested voters
are significantly less coherent in their responses to items that belong to the
economic dimension. Both these variables also predict the number of Guttman
errors in the cultural communitarian–cosmopolitan scale, with younger and less
politically interested respondents also somewhat less coherent in their responses,
Table 4. Comparison of Samples
Sample H (comm.-cos.) H (econ.)
Politically representative (EUvox) 0.49 0.38
Politically representative (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.42 0.35
Older (EUvox) 0.53 0.45
Older (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.46 0.40
Younger (EUvox) 0.43 0.32
Younger (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.40 0.33
Higher education (EUvox) 0.46 0.40
Higher education (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.39 0.39
No higher education (EUvox) 0.47 0.31
No higher education (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.37 0.27
High political interest (EUvox) 0.56 0.54
High political attention (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.48 0.50
Medium political interest (EUvox) 0.48 0.33
Medium political attention (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.40 0.27
Low political interest (EUvox) 0.38 0.16
Low political attention (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) 0.30 0.12
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although their predictive power is weaker and much less significant (it is not
significant at all for the WhoGetsMyVoteUK data set when we also control for
party affiliation). Lower education also seems to be a predictor of Guttman errors
in both scales, although the pattern is rather less clear here with low education
appearing as a stronger predictor of Guttman errors in the economic scale for
EUvox and in the cultural scale for WhoGetsMyVoteUK (contradicting the
Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression on Guttman Errors (EUvox)
Dependent Variable
Guttman Errors: (1) Economic Scale: (2) Guttman Errors: (3) Cultural Scale: (4)
Gender #0.018 (0.012) 0.048 (0.014)!!! #0.126 (0.009)!!! #0.133 (0.010)!!!
Age #0.004 (0.0004)!!! #0.007 (0.0004)!!! #0.002 (0.0003)!!! #0.001 (0.0003)!!!
Education #0.276 (0.012)!!! #0.200 (0.014)!!! #0.007 (0.009) #0.033 (0.010)!!
Pol. Int. #0.129 (0.016)!!! #0.131 (0.018)!!! #0.041 (0.012)!!! #0.026 (0.013)!
Conservative 0.113 (0.020)!!! #0.048 (0.015)!!
Labour #0.245 (0.021)!!! #0.124 (0.015)!!!
LibDem #0.120 (0.026)!!! #0.096 (0.019)!!!
Green #0.419 (0.024)!!! #0.206 (0.017)!!!
UKIP 0.304 (0.022)!!! #0.287 (0.016)!!!
Constant 1.949 (0.023)!!! 2.031 (0.028)!!! 3.255 (0.017)!!! 3.362 (0.020)!!!
Observations 42,449 36,395 43,198 36,963
LLV #110,385.50 #93,961.35 #177,284.10 #151,517.200
Theta 0.845 (0.008)!!! 0.840 (0.008)!!! 1.374 (0.010)!!! 1.349 (0.010)!!!
AIC 220,780.9 187,942.7 354,578.2 303,054.500
Notes: AIC, Akaike information criterion; LLV, log likelihood value.
!p< 0.05, !!p< 0.01, !!!p< 0.001.
Table 6. Negative Binomial Regression on Guttman Errors (WhoGetsMyVoteUK)
Dependent Variable
Guttman Errors: (1) Economic Scale: (2) Guttman Errors: (3) Cultural Scale: (4)
Gender #0.021 (0.019) 0.019 (0.020) #0.147 (0.016)!!! #0.128 (0.017)!!!
Age #0.003 (0.001)!!! #0.004 (0.001)!!! #0.001 (0.001)! #0.002 (0.001)!
Education #0.099 (0.021)!!! #0.035 (0.023) #0.066 (0.017)!!! #0.057 (0.019)!!
Pol. Att. #0.014 (0.004)!!! #0.012 (0.004)!! #0.010 (0.003)!! #0.006 (0.004)
Conservative 0.068 (0.032)! #0.044 (0.026)
Labour #0.194 (0.030)!!! #0.175 (0.025)!!!
LibDem #0.008 (0.036) #0.187 (0.030)!!!
Green #0.306 (0.037)!!! #0.221 (0.030)!!!
UKIP 0.282 (0.054)!!! #0.063 (0.045)
Constant 2.824 (0.041)!!! 2.826 (0.046)!!! 3.663 (0.033)!!! 3.740 (0.038)!!!
Observations 10,170 9,199 10,038 9,064
LLV #36,177.44 #32,635.68 #43,801.79 #39,501.33
Theta 1.288 (0.020)!!! 1.287 (0.021)!!! 1.839 (0.027)!!! 1.857 (0.028)!!!
AIC 72,364.87 65,291.36 87,613.59 79,022.670
Notes: AIC, Akaike information criterion; LLV, log likelihood value.
!p< 0.05, !!p< 0.01, !!!p< 0.001.
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findings of the previous paragraph). Gender also seems to play a role in the
coherence of responses on the cultural scale, with women more coherent than
men, but appears to have little impact on the coherence of the economic scale.
In terms of party identification, UKIP and, to a lesser extent, Conservative
identifiers tend to be less coherent on the economic scale when controlling for
other factors, while Labour and Green identifiers are more coherent on this scale.
All groups of party identifiers are more coherent on the cultural scale than non-
identifiers, in most cases significantly so.
Conclusions
This article has departed from more commonly used methods for identifying
ideological dimensions and mapping political parties, first by looking at the
“party-in-the-electorate” (i.e., ordinary voters) and second by generating ideologi-
cal dimensions inductively by identifying latent traits from voters’ opinions on a
set of varied issues. While the term “quasi inductively” (Germann et al., 2015)
might perhaps be more accurate, as the issue statements have been pre-
determined by the researchers designing the VAA, the fact remains that very
similar results are obtained from two different sets of issues statements involving
very different sets of issues, confirming the robustness of the findings.
In terms of methodology, the article has shown that VAAs are a useful tool
for generating data that can help us to address some of the core puzzles of
political science. VAAs are ideal for investigating the dimensional structure of the
political space because they contain within them a large number of issue
statements to which users express an opinion, making VAA-generated data
highly suitable for dimension reduction techniques. Of course, because VAA
users are a self-selected sample and may be unrepresentative, especially in terms
of education, age, and political interest, we must devise ways to control for
sampling bias before we can perform such analysis.
Analysis of both data sets suggests that two ideological dimensions define
adequately the policy space in England: one economic Left–Right dimension and
one cultural communitarian–cosmopolitan dimension. The latter is very clearly
distinct from the TAN/GAL dimension identified by Marks et al. (2006). While
they co-vary to a significant degree, with economic rightists tending to be more
communitarian and economic leftists tending to be more cosmopolitan, these
tendencies do not always hold and the two dimensions should be considered as
separate. The identification of the communitarian–cosmopolitan dimension lends
weight to the hypothesis of Kriesi et al. (2006) that politics is increasingly defined
by a cleavage between “winners” and “losers” of globalization, with “losers”
tending to adopt a position of cultural demarcation and to perceive “outsiders”
such as immigrants and the EU, as a threat.
Ford and Goodwin (2014) infer that UKIP draw support from those voters
who feel that they have “lost” in an increasingly globalized world, or—in their
terms—have been “left behind.” As we have seen, UKIP supporters are firmly
entrenched near the communitarian pole of the communitarian–cosmopolitan
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dimension, even among less politically interested users. Increasingly they tend to
be drawn from the economic Left as well as the economic Right, which also
supports Ford and Goodwin’s (2014) contention that they are often older blue-
collar workers who may have voted Labour some time in the past.
The most striking finding of all is that interest in politics has a large and
statistically significant impact on the coherence of the responses to the issue
statements along both dimensions. The fact that the economic dimension is far
less coherent than the cultural communitarian–cosmopolitan dimension among
less politically interested voters is especially noteworthy. This suggests that
among probably a majority of citizens, the economic dimension is not the primary
axis along which they organize their political views, but that it is the cultural
communitarian–cosmopolitan dimension that provides the guiding role. At the
same time, a subsection of English citizens—including those who have little
interest in politics—remain wedded to communitarian values. These, I would
suggest, are Ford and Goodwin’s (2014) “left behind voters,” Kriesi et al.’s (2006)
“losers” of globalization.
Another striking fact is that age seems to have a powerful and statistically
significant impact on both scales, but especially on the economic scale. Among
younger voters, the economic scale is much less coherent, even controlling for
other variables. One implication of this may be that the economic Left–Right
dimension is becoming less salient over time.
Bartolini and Mair (1990) hypothesize that the cleavages in Europe identified
by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), or at least the party systems they generated,
somehow became frozen in the twentieth century. This research would suggest
that the opening up of a new cleavage may have “unfrozen” them with the
emergence of new “communitarian” parties such as UKIP, the Sweden Demo-
crats, and the Finns party. If an economic dimension pitting Left against Right
(or labor against capital) defined the political arena in the United Kingdom and
other European countries in the twentieth century, maybe it is a cultural cleavage
that pits cosmopolitans against communitarians that defines politics in the
twenty-first.
Jonathan Wheatley, Ph.D., European University Institute, Centre for Democracy
Studies Aarau (ZDA), Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d), Kuttiger-
strasse 21, Aarau 5000, Switzerland [jonathan.wheatley64@gmail.com].
Notes
1. Goodhart, David, “How to close the door on an accidental mass migration,” Financial Times,
October 24, 2014.
2. A lack of political representativeness could have a particularly detrimental impact on identifying
dimensions in a scenario such as the following. Let us assume the ideological space were two-
dimensional, but that supporters of parties that positioned themselves along one diagonal of the
two-dimensional space were overrepresented in our sample of VAA users at the expense of
supporters of parties located along the other diagonal. In this case we may mistakenly infer from
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our data reduction techniques that the political space is one-dimensional with a single overarching
dimension. It is to identify this type of error that it was decided to randomly sample users
according to vote intention, and extract a sample of users that reflect the population as a whole in
terms of how real votes were cast.
3. To calculate this I use the check.errors function in the R package mokken (R Foundation for
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).
4. According to Rob Ford, “Ukip’s advance was slightly larger in Labour-held seats and Labour did
four points worse in the areas where Ukip advanced most, compared to a 2-point Tory drop.” Rob
Ford, “Where the votes switched—and why: the key lessons for the parties,” The Observer, May 10,
2015.
5. For education we create a variable with value 1 if the respondent has university education (in
Euvox) or has been educated up to age 20 or over (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) and 0 otherwise; for
gender the number 1 was assigned if the respondent was female, 0 if the respondent was male,
while for interest in politics (Euvox), a value of 1 is assigned to those professing to be “very” or
“somewhat” interested and 0 to those who say they have little or no interest.
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Appendix
Table A1. Issue Statements, EUvox
Item
No. Item
1 The United Kingdom should never adopt the Euro.
2 A single member state should be able to block a treaty change, even if all the other members
states agree to it.
3 The right of EU citizens to work in the United Kingdom should be restricted.
4 There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this limits the capacity of the United
Kingdom to act independently.
5 The EU should redistribute resources from richer to poorer EU regions.
6 Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for the United Kingdom.
7 EU treaties should be decided by Westminster rather than by citizens in a referendum.
8 The EU should impose economic sanctions on Russia, even if this jeopardizes gas supplies to
EU countries.
9 The United Kingdom should remain within the EU.
10 The United Kingdom should hold an in or out referendum on EU membership as soon as
possible.
11 Free market competition makes the health care system function better.
12 The number of public sector employees should be reduced.
13 The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy.
14 Wealth should be redistributed from the richest people to the poorest.
15 Cutting government spending is a good way to solve the economic crisis.
16 It should be easy for companies to fire people.
17 External loans from institutions such as the International Monetary Fund are a good solution
to crisis situations.
18 When a state rescues a bank it should take control over it.
19 The top rate of income tax should be reduced further.
20 The government should go ahead with the exploitation of underground shale gas (fracking).
21 Immigrants must adapt to the values and culture of the United Kingdom.
22 Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable in order to combat crime.
23 To maintain public order, governments should be able to restrict demonstrations.
24 Less serious crimes should be punished with community service, not imprisonment.
25 Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples to marry.
26 Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.
27 The recreational use of cannabis should be legal.
28 Islam is a threat to the values of the United Kingdom.
29 The United Kingdom should welcome a larger number of asylum seekers from war-torn
countries.
30 The United Kingdom should be allowed to set quotas on the number of EU immigrants
entering the country.
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Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the supporting
information tab for this article:
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Table A2. Issue Statements, WhoGetsMyVoteUK
Item
No.
Item
1 Government spending should be cut further in order to balance the budget.
2 A “mansion tax” should be levied on high-value residential properties.
3 Inheritance tax should be abolished.
4 Special concessions for pensioners (e.g., winter fuel allowance, free TV licences) should only
be provided to the less well-off.
5 The top rate of income tax should be reduced.
6 The railways should be renationalized.
7 The government should scrap what is commonly known as the bedroom tax.
8 Private sector involvement in the National Health Service should be reduced.
9 Young people out of work, education, or training for six months should be made to do unpaid
community work in order to get benefits.
10 The option of imprisonment should be retained for the possession of drugs for personal
consumption.
11 To fight terrorism and other serious crimes, Internet service providers and telecoms
companies should keep and surrender details of users’ activities if required by government
agencies.
12 The government should allow the extraction of underground shale gas (fracking).
13 The government should end subsidies for wind farms.
14 Same sex and heterosexual couples should enjoy the same rights to marry.
15 England should be more confident about its Christian heritage.
16 The current legal entitlement of two weeks paternity leave should be increased.
17 For social housing, priority should be given to people whose parents and grandparents were
born locally.
18 State schools should be able to select pupils according to ability.
19 Free Schools and Academies should be brought back under Local Authority control.
20 University tuition fees should be scrapped.
21 The United Kingdom should remain within the EU.
22 The United Kingdom should maintain its support to developing countries through foreign aid.
23 The Trident nuclear weapons system should be scrapped.
24 The United Kingdom should be able to restrict the number of EU immigrants entering the
country.
25 The National Health Service should give priority to British citizens.
26 State benefits should only be available to those who have lived in the United Kingdom for at
least five years.
27 Only English Members of Parliament should have the right to vote on issues that only affect
England.
28 The House of Lords should be replaced by a directly elected chamber.
29 Young people should be given the right to vote at the age of 16.
30 The United Kingdom should withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights.
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